posted
Anyone else listening to this? Kinda makes your head spin there is so much info. Its not a witch hunt, and it shouldn't be, which is a refreshing change.
However I found the slanderous nature that the Bush Admin took towards Richard Clark just reprehensable and indicates a total lack of scruples. Bush & his admin were not responsible for letting 9/11 happen, but they should be culpable to valid criticism of Admin policy.
posted
I heard most of it. I think the questioning was fair. Even to Clark, although I think he is a bit more to blame then he is willing to admit. His criticism of the Bush admin and book tour statements are in direct contridiction of his resignation letter to Bush and the much talked about Foxnews transcript - so I don't know who to believe.....
Transcript: Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02
Wednesday, March 24, 2004
WASHINGTON The following transcript documents a background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his post in January 2003.
RICHARD CLARKE: Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.
Second point is that the Clinton administration had a strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they remained on the table when that administration went out of office issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy -- uh, changing our policy toward Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy. They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not been decided on in a couple of years.
And the third point is the Bush administration decided then, you know, in late January, to do two things. One, vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to some extent.
And the point is, while this big review was going on, there were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them decided.
So, point five, that process which was initiated in the first week in February, uh, decided in principle, uh in the spring to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five-fold, to go after Al Qaeda.
The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies and you had to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late March, early April. The deputies then tasked the development of the implementation details, uh, of these new decisions that they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals.
Over the course of the summer last point they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance.
And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.
QUESTION: When was that presented to the president?
CLARKE: Well, the president was briefed throughout this process.
QUESTION: But when was the final September 4 document? (interrupted) Was that presented to the president?
CLARKE: The document went to the president on September 10, I think.
QUESTION: What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus against the general animus against the foreign policy?
CLARKE: I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous team to me.
JIM ANGLE: You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct?
CLARKE: All of that's correct.
ANGLE: OK.
QUESTION: Are you saying now that there was not only a plan per se, presented by the transition team, but that it was nothing proactive that they had suggested?
CLARKE: Well, what I'm saying is, there are two things presented. One, what the existing strategy had been. And two, a series of issues like aiding the Northern Alliance, changing Pakistan policy, changing Uzbek policy that they had been unable to come to um, any new conclusions, um, from '98 on.
QUESTION: Was all of that from '98 on or was some of it ...
CLARKE: All of those issues were on the table from '98 on.
ANGLE: When in '98 were those presented?
CLARKE: In October of '98.
QUESTION: In response to the Embassy bombing?
CLARKE: Right, which was in September.
QUESTION: Were all of those issues part of alleged plan that was late December and the Clinton team decided not to pursue because it was too close to ...
CLARKE: There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was these two things: One, a description of the existing strategy, which included a description of the threat. And two, those things which had been looked at over the course of two years, and which were still on the table.
QUESTION: So there was nothing that developed, no documents or no new plan of any sort?
CLARKE: There was no new plan.
QUESTION: No new strategy I mean, I don't want to get into a semantics ...
CLARKE: Plan, strategy there was no, nothing new.
QUESTION: 'Til late December, developing ...
CLARKE: What happened at the end of December was that the Clinton administration NSC principals committee met and once again looked at the strategy, and once again looked at the issues that they had brought, decided in the past to add to the strategy. But they did not at that point make any recommendations.
QUESTIONS: Had those issues evolved at all from October of '98 'til December of 2000?
CLARKE: Had they evolved? Um, not appreciably.
ANGLE: What was the problem? Why was it so difficult for the Clinton administration to make decisions on those issues?
CLARKE: Because they were tough issues. You know, take, for example, aiding the Northern Alliance. Um, people in the Northern Alliance had a, sort of bad track record. There were questions about the government, there were questions about drug-running, there was questions about whether or not in fact they would use the additional aid to go after Al Qaeda or not. Uh, and how would you stage a major new push in Uzbekistan or somebody else or Pakistan to cooperate?
One of the big problems was that Pakistan at the time was aiding the other side, was aiding the Taliban. And so, this would put, if we started aiding the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, this would have put us directly in opposition to the Pakistani government. These are not easy decisions.
ANGLE: And none of that really changed until we were attacked and then it was ...
CLARKE: No, that's not true. In the spring, the Bush administration changed began to change Pakistani policy, um, by a dialogue that said we would be willing to lift sanctions. So we began to offer carrots, which made it possible for the Pakistanis, I think, to begin to realize that they could go down another path, which was to join us and to break away from the Taliban. So that's really how it started.
QUESTION: Had the Clinton administration in any of its work on this issue, in any of the findings or anything else, prepared for a call for the use of ground forces, special operations forces in any way? What did the Bush administration do with that if they had?
CLARKE: There was never a plan in the Clinton administration to use ground forces. The military was asked at a couple of points in the Clinton administration to think about it. Um, and they always came back and said it was not a good idea. There was never a plan to do that.
(Break in briefing details as reporters and Clarke go back and forth on how to source quotes from this backgrounder.)
ANGLE: So, just to finish up if we could then, so what you're saying is that there was no one, there was no plan; two, there was no delay; and that actually the first changes since October of '98 were made in the spring months just after the administration came into office?
CLARKE: You got it. That's right.
QUESTION: It was not put into an action plan until September 4, signed off by the principals?
CLARKE: That's right.
QUESTION: I want to add though, that NSPD the actual work on it began in early April.
CLARKE: There was a lot of in the first three NSPDs that were being worked in parallel.
ANGLE: Now the five-fold increase for the money in covert operations against Al Qaeda did that actually go into effect when it was decided or was that a decision that happened in the next budget year or something?
CLARKE: Well, it was gonna go into effect in October, which was the next budget year, so it was a month away.
QUESTION: That actually got into the intelligence budget?
CLARKE: Yes it did.
QUESTION: Just to clarify, did that come up in April or later?
CLARKE: No, it came up in April and it was approved in principle and then went through the summer. And you know, the other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback strategy to the elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve this problem, then that was the strategic direction that changed the NSPD from one of rollback to one of elimination.
QUESTION: Well can you clarify something? I've been told that he gave that direction at the end of May. Is that not correct?
CLARKE: No, it was March.
QUESTION: The elimination of Al Qaeda, get back to ground troops now we haven't completely done that even with a substantial number of ground troops in Afghanistan. Was there, was the Bush administration contemplating without the provocation of September 11th moving troops into Afghanistan prior to that to go after Al Qaeda?
CLARKE: I can not try to speculate on that point. I don't know what we would have done.
QUESTION: In your judgment, is it possible to eliminate Al Qaeda without putting troops on the ground?
CLARKE: Uh, yeah, I think it was. I think it was. If we'd had Pakistani, Uzbek and Northern Alliance assistance.
Posts: 5484 | From: St. Paul, Mn | Registered: Apr 2002
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posted
Here's the part of the transcript where they try and tackle the conflict you mention. I'm actually listening too it again, while reading it. I agree with ya, I've a tough time figuring out his explanation for the conflicting statements
THOMPSON: Mr. Clarke, as we sit here this afternoon, we have your book and we have your press briefing of August 2002. Which is true?
CLARKE: Well, I think the question is a little misleading.
The press briefing you're referring to comes in the following context: Time magazine had published a cover story article highlighting what your staff briefing talks about. They had learned that, as your staff briefing notes, that there was a strategy or a plan and a series of additional options that were presented to the national security adviser and the new Bush team when they came into office.
Time magazine ran a somewhat sensational story that implied that the Bush administration hadn't worked on that plan. And this, of course, coming after 9/11 caused the Bush White House a great deal of concern.
So I was asked by several people in senior levels of the Bush White House to do a press backgrounder to try to explain that set of facts in a way that minimized criticism of the administration. And so I did.
Now, we can get into semantic games of whether it was a strategy, or whether it was a plan, or whether it was a series of options to be decided upon. I think the facts are as they were outlined in your staff briefing.
THOMPSON: Well, let's take a look, then, at your press briefing, because I don't want to engage in semantic games. You said, the Bush administration decided, then, you know, mid-January -- that's mid- January, 2001 -- to do 2 things: one, vigorously pursue the existing the policy -- that would be the Clinton policy -- including all of the lethal covert action findings which we've now made public to some extent. Is that so? Did they decide in January of 2001 to vigorously pursue the existing Clinton policy?
CLARKE: They decided that the existing covert action findings would remain in effect.
THOMPSON: OK. The second thing the administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them decided. Now, that seems to indicate to me that proposals had been sitting on the table in the Clinton administration for a couple of years, but that the Bush administration was going to get them done. Is that a correct assumption?
CLARKE: Well, that was my hope at the time. It turned out not to be the case.
THOMPSON: Well, then why in August of 2002, over a year later, did you say that it was the case?
CLARKE: I was asked to make that case to the press. I was a special assistant to the president, and I made the case I was asked to make.
THOMPSON: Are you saying to be you were asked to make an untrue case to the press and the public, and that you went ahead and did it?
THOMPSON: Well, OK, over the course of the summer, they developed implementation details. The principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold. Did they authorize the increase in funding five-fold?
CLARKE: Authorized but not appropriated.
THOMPSON: Well, but the Congress appropriates, don't they, Mr. Clarke?
CLARKE: Well, within the executive branch, there are two steps as well. In the executive branch, there's the policy process which you can compare to authorization, which is to say we would like to spend this amount of money for this program. And then there is the second step, the budgetary step, which is to find the offsets. And that had not been done. In fact, it wasn't done until after September 11th.
THOMPSON: Changing the policy on Pakistan, was the policy on Pakistan changed?
CLARKE: Yes, sir it was.
THOMPSON: Changing the policy on Uzbekistan, was it changed?
CLARKE: Yes, sir.
THOMPSON: Changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance, was that changed?
CLARKE: Well, let me back up. I said yes to the last two answers. It was changed only after September 11th. It had gone through an approvals process. It was going through an approvals process with the deputies committee. And they had approved it -- The deputies had approved those policy changes. It had then gone to a principals committee for approval, and that occurred on September 4th. Those three things which you mentioned were approved by the principals. They were not approved by the president, and therefore the final approval hadn't occurred until after September 11th. THOMPSON: But they were approved by people in the administration below the level of the president, moving toward the president. Is that correct?
CLARKE: Yes, so over the course of many, many months, they went through several committee meetings at the sub-Cabinet level. And then there was a hiatus. And then they went to finally on September 4th, a week before the attacks, they went to the principals for their approval. Of course, the final approval by the president didn't take place until after the attacks.
THOMPSON: Well is that eight-month period unusual?
CLARKE: It is unusual when you are being told every day that there is an urgent threat.
CLARKE: The secretary of state has, as a member of the principals committee, that kind of authority over all foreign policy issues.
THOMPSON: Changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance, that would have been DOD?
CLARKE: No. Governor, that would have been the CIA.
But again, all of the right people to make those kinds of changes were represented by the five or six people on the principals committee.
THOMPSON: But they were also represented on the smaller group, were they not, the deputies committee?
CLARKE: But they didn't have the authority to approve it. They only had the authority to recommend it further up the process.
THOMPSON: Well, is policy usually made at the level of the principals committee before it comes up?
CLARKE: Policy usually originates in working groups. Recommendations and differences then are floated up from working groups to the deputies committee. If there are differences there, policy recommendations and differences are then floated up to the principals. And occasionally, when there is not a consensus at the principals level, policy recommendations and options, or differences, go to the president. And the president makes these kinds of decisions.
By law, in fact, many of the kinds of decisions you're talking about can only be made by the president.
THOMPSON: And you said that the strategy changed from one of rollback with Al Qaida over the course of five years, which it had been, which I presume is the Clinton policy, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaida, that is in fact the time line. Is that correct?
CLARKE: It is, but it requires a bit of elaboration. As your staff brief said, the goal of the Delenda Plan was to roll back Al Qaida over the course of three to five years so that it was just a nub of an organization like Abu Nidal that didn't threaten the United States.
I tried to insert the phrase early in the Bush administration in the draft NSPD that our goal should be to eliminate Al Qaida. And I was told by various members of the deputies committee that that was overly ambitious and that we should take the word eliminate out and say significantly erode.
THOMPSON: And you were asked when was...
KEAN: Governor, one more question.
THOMPSON: When was that presented to the president? And you answered: the president was briefed throughout this process.
CLARKE: Yes. The president apparently asked, on one occasion that I'm aware of, for a strategy. And when he asked that, he apparently didn't know there was a strategy in the works. I, therefore, was told about this by the national security adviser.
I came back to her and said, well, there is a strategy; after all, it's basically what I showed you in January. It stuck in the deputies committee. She said she would tell the president that, and she said she would try to break it out of the deputies committee.
THOMPSON: So you believed that your conference with the press in August of 2002 is consistent with what you've said in your book and what you've said in press interviews the last five days about your book?
CLARKE: I do. I think the think that's obviously bothering you is the tenor and the tone. And I've tried to explain to you, sir, that when you're on the staff of the president of the United States, you try to make his policies look as good as possible.
THOMPSON: Well, with all respect, Mr. Clarke, I think a lot of things beyond the tenor and the tone bother me about this.
KEAN: Thank you, Governor. Commissioner Gorelick.
GORELICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Clarke, for your testimony today. You have talked about a plan that you presented to Dr. Rice immediately upon her becoming national security adviser, and that in response to questions from Commissioner Gorton, you said elements of that plan, which were developed by you and your staff at the end of 2000 -- many elements -- became part of what was then called NSPD-9, or what ultimately became NSPD-9.
When Dr. Rice writes in the Washington Post, No Al Qaida plan was turned over to the new administration, is that true?
CLARKE: No. I think what is true is what your staff found by going through the documents and what your staff briefing says, which is that early in the administration, within days of the Bush administration coming into office, that we gave them two documents. In fact, I briefed Dr. Rice on this even before they came into office.
GORELICK: Thank you.
I'd like to turn NSPD-9, the document that was wending its way through the process up until September 4th. The document is classified so I can only speak of it in generalities.
But as I understand it, it had three stages which were to take place over, according to Steve Hadley, the deputy national security adviser, over a period of three years.
The first stage was, we would warn the Taliban. The second stage was we would pressure the Taliban. And the third stage was that we would look for ways to oust the Taliban based upon individuals on the ground other than ourselves, at the same time making military contingency plans.
Is that correct?
CLARKE: Well, that's right. The military contingency plans had always been around, but there was nothing in the original draft, NSPD, that was approved by the principals to suggest U.S. forces would be sent into Afghanistan on the ground.
GORELICK: In addition to that, Director Tenet was asked to draft new additional covert action authorities. Is that right?
CLARKE: That's right, in part because Mr. Hadley found the existing six memorandums of covert action authority to be talmudic -- it's actually I think Mr. Hadley who gets credit for that word.
But it wasn't really meant to expand them significantly other than providing direct aid to Afghan factions.
GORELICK: Now you have just described, then, the skeleton, if you will, of what was approved by the administration as of September 4th. And we know that no further action was taken before September 11th.
Is that an accurate statement, in your view?
CLARKE: No, it's not.
GORELICK: In addition to the items that were left hanging during this period of time that we've talked about, in your view -- the predator, the issue of aid to the Northern Alliance, the response to the Cole -- the other item that we have heard about that was deferred until the policy emerged was action on the set of covert authorities or the draft of covert authorities that Director Tenet supplied to the NSC in I believe it was March of '01. Is that true?
CLARKE: Yes.
GORELICK: And no action was taken on those until after 9/11. Is that correct?
CLARKE: That's correct.
GORELICK: After the millennium, you were asked by Sandy Berger, and he testified about it this morning, to do an after-action report. And he described how there were 29 recommendations and a huge supplemental, et cetera. The report doesn't address some of the systemic issues.
And you, above maybe anybody else, saw the systemic problems. I mean you have described, yourself, the problems with the FBI, the wall between the FBI and the CIA. We've heard about the disconnect between the State Department watch list and the FAA no-fly list. We've heard about really the inadequacy of our visa program and our consular effort.
So my question for you is this: You had a great shot after the millennium to take a whack at these problems which you no doubt must have seen or maybe -- I'll give you the benefit of the doubt -- perhaps there are some you hadn't seen. Why wasn't the after-action report, post-millennium, as modest as it was. Why didn't it address these fissures and these gaps in the system?
CLARKE: Well, it made 28 or 29 recommendations. Had all of those recommendations been easy to do, they would have been implemented, before or after the after-action report.
That's probably why some of them never got done. And some of them still haven't been done. I've learned over time that if you go for the perfect solution, the best solution, you don't get very far in actually achieving things. You can write nice reports if you're the Brookings commission or something, but if you want to get something done in the real world, you do what is doable and you try to do a little bit more. But you don't shoot for the moon.
And I think some of systemic things that are obvious to you and -- I know they are -- were more practical after 9/11 than they were after the millennium. Remember, in the millennium, we succeeded in stopping the attacks. That was good news.
But it was not good news for those of us who also wanted to put pressure on the Congress and pressure on OMB and other places because we were not able to point to -- and I hate to say this -- body bags. You know, unfortunately, this country takes body bags and requires body bags sometimes to make really tough decisions about money and about governmental arrangements.
And one of the things I would hope that comes out of your commission report is a recommendation for a change in the attitude of government about threats, that we be able to act on threats that we foresee, even if acting requires boldness and requires money and requires changing the way we do business, that we act on threats in the future before they happen.
The problem is that when you make that recommendation before they happen, when you recommend an air defense system for Washington before there has been a 9/11, people tend to think you're nuts. And I got a lot of that. You know, when the Clinton administration ended, 35 Americans had died at hands of Al Qaida over the course of eight years. And a lot of people said, behind my back and some of them to my face, why are you so obsessed with this organization? It's only killed eight Americans over the course -- 35 Americans over the course of eight years. Why are you making such a big deal over this organization?
That's the kind of mind set that made it difficult for us, even though the president, the national security adviser, and others, the DCI, knew there was a problem and were supporting me. But the institutional bureaucracy and the FBI and DOD and then CIA and OMB and on the Hill -- because I spent a lot of time up here trying to get money and trying to change authorities -- couldn't see the threat because it hadn't happened.
GORELICK: Well, that's a very sobering statement, particularly from someone whose reputation is as aggressive as your reputation is. And it makes me think that individuals who are less of a pile driver -- to use Sandy Berger's words -- must feel even less able to push for change.
KEAN: Secretary Lehman?
LEHMAN: Thank you.
Dick, since you and I first served 28 years ago in the MBFR delegation, I have genuinely been a fan of yours. I've watched you labor without fear of favor in a succession of jobs where you really made a difference. And so when you agreed to spend as much time as you did with us in, as you say, 15 hours, I was very hopeful.
And I attended one of those all-day sessions and read the other two transcripts, and I thought they were terrific. I thought here we have a guy who can be the Rosetta Stone for helping this commission do its job, to help to have the American people grasp what the dysfunctional problems in this government are.
And I thought you let the chips fall where they may. You made a few value judgments which could be debated. But by and large, you were critical of the things, institutions, and people that could have done better and some that did very badly.
And certainly the greater weight of this criticism fell during the Clinton years simply because there were eight of them and only 7 1/2 months of the Bush years. I don't think you, in the transcripts that we have of your classified interviews, pulled punches in either direction. And, frankly, a lot of my questioning this past two days has been drawn from some of the things that you articulated so well during the Clinton years, particularly, because they stretched from the first, as you pointed out, attempt by Saddam to assassinate President Bush 41 right up through the end of the administration.
But now we have the book. And I've published books. And I must say I am green with envy at the promotion department of your publisher.
(LAUGHTER)
Until I started reading those press reports, and I said this can't be the same Dick Clarke that testified before us, because all of the promotional material and all of the spin in the networks was that this is a rounding, devastating attack -- this book -- on President Bush.
That's not what I heard in the interviews. And I hope you're going to tell me, as you apologized to the families for all of us who were involved in national security, that this tremendous difference -- and not just in nuance, but in the stories you choose to tell -- is really the result of your editors and your promoters, rather than your studied judgment, because it is so different from the whole thrust of your testimony to us.
And similarly, when you add to it the inconsistency between what your promoters are putting out and what you yourself said as late as August '05, you've got a real credibility problem.
And because of my real genuine long-term admiration for you, I hope you'll resolve that credibility problem, because I'd hate to see you become totally shoved to one side during a presidential campaign as an active partisan selling a book.
CLARKE: Thank you, John.
(LAUGHTER)
Let me talk about partisanship here, since you raise it. I've been accused of being a member of John Kerry's campaign team several times this week, including by the White House. So let's just lay that one to bed. I'm not working for the Kerry campaign. Last time I had to declare my party loyalty, it was to vote in the Virginia primary for president of the United States in the year 2000. And I asked for a Republican ballot.
Now, the fact of the matter is, I do co-teach a class with someone who works for Senator Kerry. That person is named Randy Beers. Randy Beers and I have worked together in the federal government and the White House and the State Department for 25 years.
Randy Beers worked in the White House for Ronald Reagan. Randy Beers worked in the White House for the first President Bush, and Randy Beers worked in the White House for the second President Bush.
And just because he is now working for Senator Kerry, I am not going to disassociate myself from one of my best friends and someone who I greatly respect and worked with for 25 years.
And, yes, I will admit, I co-teach a class at the Harvard University and Georgetown University with Mr. Beers. That, I don't think, makes me a member of the Kerry campaign.
The White House has said that my book is an audition for a high- level position in the Kerry campaign. So let me say here as I am under oath, that I will not accept any position in the Kerry administration, should there be one -- on the record, under oath.
Now, as to your accusation that there is a difference between what I said to this commission in 15 hours of testimony and what I am saying in my book and what media outlets are asking me to comment on, I think there's a very good reason for that.
In the 15 hours of testimony, no one asked me what I thought about the president's invasion of Iraq. And the reason I am strident in my criticism of the president of the United States is because by invading Iraq -- something I was not asked about by the commission, it's something I chose write about a lot in the book -- by invading Iraq the president of the United States has greatly undermined the war on terrorism.
KEAN: Commissioner Fielding?
FIELDING: Mr. Clarke, thank you for being here.
I shared John's feelings when I read your interviews with the staff as well, because it gave a perspective of something that bridged different administrations and really had a chance to see it. And of course, you were looking at it from different level than some of the other people we had interviewed.
And likewise, I was a little taken back when I saw the hoopla and the promotion for the book and when I saw this transcript that just came forward today.
Did you ever list for the joint inquiry any of the measures that you thought should have been taken that weren't?
CLARKE: I think all the measures that I thought should have been taken were in the plan that I presented in January of 2001 and were in the NSPD that the principals approved in September, September 4th, 2001. There were no additional measures that I had in mind other than those that I presented. And as I did explain, both to the commission and to the joint inquiry, those proposals, which ultimately were adopted by the principals committee, took a very, very, very long time to make it through the policy development process.
FIELDING: Well, I understand that, but I think the charges that you've made are much more -- I think they're much deeper than that.
Let me ask you a question, because it's been bothering me as well. You've been involved intimately in PDD-39 and in PDD-62. The latter certainly very much implicates your own position. How long did it take for those to be developed and signed?
CLARKE: I'm not sure I could recollect that answer. Perhaps the staff could find that.
To your general answer about how long does it take PDDs to be signed, I've seen them signed in a day and I've seen them take three years.
FIELDING: Well, of course. I mean, we've all seen that. But these were -- obviously 62 was a very important one, but obviously the one that we're talking about that was developed was an extremely important one, and it was one that you put a lot into yourself. And it was in the beginning of a new administration.
Anyway...
CLARKE: Sir, if I may?
FIELDING: Yes?
CLARKE: There's also the issue that was raised earlier by another member of the commission was to whether all of the pending decisions needed to be rolled up into a national security presidential directive or whether, based on the urgency of the intelligence, some of them couldn't -- like arming the Predator to attack and kill bin Laden -- why did that have to wait until the entire policy was developed?
FIELDING: I understand. And I understand your testimony that you did that. What I don't understand is, if you had these deep feelings and deep concerns about the lack of ability and urgency within the Bush administration, that you didn't advise the joint inquiry. And I mean, did you feel it unnecessary to tell them that the Bush administration was too preoccupied with the Cold War issues or Iraq at that point?
CLARKE: I wasn't asked, sir. I think I provided the joint inquiry, as a member of the administration at the time, please recall, I provided the joint inquiry all the facts it needed to make the conclusions which I've made about how long it took and what the development of the policy process was like and the refusal of the administration to spin out for earlier decision things like the armed Predator.
FIELDING: Well, it obviously will be up to the members of the joint inquiry to make that decision and judgment.
But, you must agree that it's not like -- going before a joint inquiry is not like going before a press background briefing. As you said, I think your description was I tried to highlight the positive and play down the negative. But the joint inquiry wasn't asking you to do that, they were asking you to come forward, weren't they?
CLARKE: I answered very fully all of the questions the joint inquiry had asked. They said that themselves in their comments to me, and in their report. I testified for six hours. And I testified as a member of the Bush administration.
And I think, sir, with all of your experience in this city, you understand as well as I do the freedom one has to speak critical of an administration when one is a member of that administration.
FIELDING: I do understand that. But I also understand the integrity with which you have to take your job. But thank you, sir.
posted
Yes, I did listen to that entire part and it's confusing.
If you get a chance to watch Condi Rice tonight on Hannity & Combes at 8pmcst she is going to address his accusations. Should be interesting - wonder why she won't testify??
Posts: 5484 | From: St. Paul, Mn | Registered: Apr 2002
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THOMPSON: Mr. Clarke, in this background briefing, as Senator Kerrey has now described it, for the press in August of 2002, you intended to mislead the press, did you not?
THOMPSON: Why was that, Mr. Clarke? You finally resigned because you were frustrated.
CLARKE: I was, at that time, at the request of the president, preparing a national strategy to defend America's cyberspace, something which I thought then and think now is vitally important. I thought that completing that strategy was a lot more important than whether or not I had to provide emphasis in one place or other while discussing the facts on this particular news story.
The second choice one has, Governor, is whether or not to say things that are untruthful. And no one in the Bush White House asked me to say things that were untruthful, and I would not have said them.
In any event, the third choice that one has is to put the best face you can for the administration on the facts as they were, and that is what I did.
I think that is what most people in the White House in any administration do when they're asked to explain something that is embarrassing to the administration.
THOMPSON: But you will admit that what you said in August of 2002 is inconsistent with what you say in your book?
CLARKE: No, I don't think it's inconsistent at all. I think, as I said in your last round of questioning, Governor, that it's really a matter here of emphasis and tone. I mean, what you're suggesting, perhaps, is that as special assistant to the president of the United States when asked to give a press backgrounder I should spend my time in that press backgrounder criticizing him. I think that's somewhat of an unrealistic thing to expect.
THOMPSON: Well, what it suggests to me is that there is one standard of candor and morality for White House special assistants and another standard of candor and morality for the rest of America.
CLARKE: I don't think it's a question of morality at all. I think it's a question of politics.
THOMPSON: Well, I...
(APPLAUSE)
THOMPSON: I'm not a Washington insider. I've never been a special assistant in the White House. I'm from the Midwest. So I think I'll leave it there.
posted
It really looks like he has changed his story as of late. The statement about just saying what Bush asked him to is a convenient way out in my opinion.. In the press briefing he says "Clinton had no plan for Al Quida to pass onto Bush" etc. Then in the book/testimony he says Clinton had no higher priority than Al Quida....
I heard Senator Kyl on the radio - he told of several times Clark was before his committee and made statements consistent with what he used to say (Clinton had no plan etc.) He said Clark always speaks his mind etc.... see press release below
Kyl Comments On Clarke Allegations Says Clarkes Political Attacks Unwarranted
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- U.S. Senator Jon Kyl, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, today issued the following statement in response to Dick Clarkes statements attributing blame for the 9/11 attacks to the Bush administration:
Dick Clarke appeared before my subcommittee during both the Clinton and Bush years, and I know that his concerns about the governments response to terrorism long preceded the current administration. Indeed, if were going to start assessing blame for 9/11, then one must consider that the Clinton administration had eight years to confront the al-Maida threat, and the Bush administration less than eight months.
So imagine my surprise to learn that, in the course of his book tour, Dick Clarke has chosen to save his sharpest rebukes for the Bush administration, rather than the Clinton team. That may help him with book sales, but its not a full or fair assessment of the views I know he held. As I learn more about Clarkes connections to people on the Kerry presidential campaign, its become quite clear that his attacks have more to do with politics than public service. Thats disappointing, to say the least.
Until Dick Clarke produces his detailed strategy memo that would have toppled the Taliban government in record time, captured or killed 2/3 of known al-Maida leaders, bolstered dramatically intelligence-sharing here at home, and assembled one of the greatest global coalitions in history to go after terrorists all over the world, Ill find it hard to believe he had a better plan for fighting terrorism than George W. Bush.
Posts: 5484 | From: St. Paul, Mn | Registered: Apr 2002
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posted
Joe i hope that you are not posting this stuff to try and defend that spineless piece of shit. It is so simply obvious that this guy has done a 180° turn in his oppinion and story and is doing so due to outside influence (READ THE CLINTON DEMOCRATS) that i dont know how you could see it any other way. The guy is obviously being paid to do so. And i find that kerry has much the same mind in doing things. If Kerry wins it will be the closesed anyone has ever and probably will ever come to buying the whitehouse. There is money flying all over to have people like clark say shit like this and it is so transparent that it makes me sick. I may not agree with all of bush's positions but at least he takes positions on things and sticks with them. A kerry white house scares me almost as much as the thought of a gore white house did 4 years ago.
This country is divided between the logical and the emotional and it is only getting worse day by day.
Posts: 2331 | From: Rosemount | Registered: Mar 2001
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Klaus: And I see his being directed by Bush to "paint a positive picture" is politics as usual for this Admin (and previous Admins). Very rarely does a Govt entity come out and say "I/we Fucked UP". So its spin, I'm not suprised, and don't have a prob with that explanation. What I've got out of the "conflicting" reports, is that his books criticism of Bush is also based on Clarks belief that going into Iraq was misguided. It would not help to find BinLaden, or in rooting out AlQueda, and likely worsend our image in the Muslim world, and been a great recruitment tool for terrorist groups....
Posts: 2469 | From: Anchorage, AK | Registered: Oct 2001
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posted
He has an axe to grind its obvious (and in some ways understandable). He is entitled to his opinion on Iraq (even if it changed after the fact). But I think he in many ways has been proven wrong on going into Iraq anyway. He's a drama queen - come on apologizing to the victims of the 9/11 attacks?
Posts: 5484 | From: St. Paul, Mn | Registered: Apr 2002
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posted
It's a sad day when john kerry is the best that the dems can put forward. Just like it was a sad day when bob dole was the best that the repubs could come up with. Bush is better but still leaves lots to be desired.
I think kerry will win but this shit is getting old.
I think about the only guy i would truly want to see in the whitehouse is John McCain.
Posts: 2331 | From: Rosemount | Registered: Mar 2001
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posted
This whole public hearings for the commission nonsence was doomed to degrade into this kind of political tripe from the begining.
Basically everyone is going to blame everyone except thoes realy responsible which are the towelheads who did this and those who are any part of any organization involved.
It's time to shut up, learn from it, move on, and and do the best we can to make sure it never happens again.
posted
Dude... Did you actually listen to the hearings?????
Doomed to Degrade??? WTF ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT.... It didn't degrade into anything. Either you unconditionally excuse/defend anything Bush does, or you didn't listen to the hearings...
It wasn't a witch hunt, and despite Clark being critical of Bush on a particular area, there was a lot of other info put out, about our shortcomings in dealing with these types of threats from Terrorist Orgs, and the problems of communications between Govt. entities in this hugh bureacracy of a system.
Exactly how are you supposed to "Shut up, learn from it, and move on...." if you don't have the hearings and open review in the first place to learn from it......
posted
Of course i have been following these hearings.
Back down fido...
Joe it is obvious this whole thing has become tainted by political bias from both sides. Can you not see the forrest for the trees on this issue!?!?!?!?!?!
Wake up man!
Each party is trying to blame the other for this when neither had the tools to see it coming. The blame game needs to stop. The whole thing has degridated into this.
My point is there is to much using 20/20 hindsight to try and blame this admin or that admin. It will get us nowhere. We need to find out where we could have stoped this and make changes to procedure and policy not blame people for what they never could have seen coming. If some people need to get fired who droped the ball so be it but i cannot belive that either bush or clinton had any knowlegde and just arbitrarily decided not to avoid something like sept 11th. Nor do i think either was directly negligent in their policies. BUT clintons funding policies could have hurt our intelgence abilities to a point where we may have had the chance to stop the attacks. But i do not think you can hold him directly responsible for the attacks.
It is still a political inqiry and thus much of it will be useless banter. THAT is my point.
Posts: 2331 | From: Rosemount | Registered: Mar 2001
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posted
I listened to almost the entire hearings today. I thought Dr. Rice did pretty well. It started out pretty civil, her statement at the beginning was on point and didn't start any finger pointing. After the first hour it did as Chad said of the Clark testimony "degrade into political tripe" and grandstanding by the Democrates. Chairman Kerry even gave a little speech about Iraq... This is supposed to be about 9/11. After that she quoted a speech that Kerry had made in support of going after Saddam (I guess she anticipated the comments from Kerry and did some research )
Richard Ben-Veniste went after her pretty hard and constantly interupted her and wouldn't let her answer. I thought that a bit over the top and found myself saying "shut the fuck up and let her answer" alot.....
Posts: 5484 | From: St. Paul, Mn | Registered: Apr 2002
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posted
I think the most telling thing of this admin is the number of supporters/insiders of the admin who have resigned (and specifically who its been and what position they were in). High level whistleblowers have been folks with long records of supporting the republican party and conservative ideology, and independents. And the number of low level whistleblowers who've been dealt with heavy handedly is just unreal. The lengths to which this admin goes to silence said whistlblowers, even to the lowest level is just unconcscionable. And instead of taking issue with the specific reasons for peoples various exodus, they just attack the person. The secrecy and behind doors additude of the admin is excessive. I cant remember anything to this level and numbers of criticism from insiders of Clinton, Bush Sr., Reagan, etc...
And I not really talking about Clarke, but the hoard of predecessors, from the Defense side of the admin to the EPA. Personally I think some of Clarkes story is too fishy and the conflicts are suspicious.
However I think Rice dodged a lot of direct questions, specifically the Richard Ben-Veniste episode you mention, but I have to go back and see the transcript to get more details about her anwsers, just didn't catch it all. Its tough to absorb everything just listening to it while doing my work.
Posts: 2469 | From: Anchorage, AK | Registered: Oct 2001
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posted
I think the whistle blowers you are always referring to aren't relevant to this hearing but in the areas you mention (EPA etc) there might be something to it.
My take on the "heated" exchanges in the Dr. Rice testimony were that she did answer the yes/no portion right away but was cut off when she wanted to fully elaborate on the point. (I know right now Joe is looking for a section of the transcript to cut and paste ) I did count one question (I forget which one) she did completely dodge tho Posts: 5484 | From: St. Paul, Mn | Registered: Apr 2002
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quote:Originally posted by Klaus: [QB]I think the whistle blowers you are always referring to aren't relevant to this hearing but in the areas you mention (EPA etc) there might be something to it. [QB]
Ya I know, just a statment, I just think its telling of the general attitude and standard op procedure of the admin as a whole, and one of the reasons I think it must end.
Personally I doubt either admin, Clintons, now Bushs, had a good handle on how to deal with AlQueda prior to 9/11. I'm skeptical that much could of been done to stop 9/11, so the blame game doesn't fly with me. What I think is silly is the suggestion that the Govt security/defense entities we're ready or hadn't considered planes being used as missles????? Shit any 14 y.o. playing a flight sim game could figure that out. Whats sad is that there was no unified contingancy to combat this possibility.
Im not gonna get into it on details of Rice's testimony, as there are sure to be differences from Clarks, but I don't trust either particularly. But I will read it just to see precisily what she says. I'm listening to her opening statement again right now.
I like Kerry's (in the commision, not the canidate) statement about terrorism. That this is not a war on terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic, employed by radical fundamentalist islamist. Thats who we're at war with. And I don't think this admin (or its predecessor) really grasps that, and if they do/did, they cant think outside the box in order to effectively deal with it. You may not care what the rest of the world thinks of the U.S. But I don't think its unrealistice to see that some of our actions and policy (both recent & past) **EDIT**or even perceived actions, or just made up events, etc.* have helped to promote the cause of the enemy, or at least increased their support base.
posted
I believe you are correct on the everyone's to blame comment. There wasn't a plan, but there are a million ways someone could attack the USA and it's interests. Tough to protect against everything. (note that I am not only blaming the Clinton admin but both admins)
I do care what the world thinks of our county. But only to a point. The US needs to protect it's own interests and take the fight(war) to the terrorists. The world (specifically France and Germany) are appeasers and in the case of Iraq were making millions off illegal oil sales. Look at what is currently happening in Iraq - Japanese hostages, with demands to leave Iraq. Where do you thing that tactic came from? The Spain election taught the terrorists they can influence world events and get things done using these methods. Much like what the terrorists learned from Somalia - kill a few americans and we pull out. I fear if Kerry gets elected the progress Bush had made in rolling back terror will be reversed.
Posts: 5484 | From: St. Paul, Mn | Registered: Apr 2002
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posted
I said "YOU" may not care in a generic sense, not you specifically. More saying that there is more to this issue than Bush's soundbite would suggest "These People Hate Freedom" is not in the least bit insightfull into the root causes of Radical Islams hatred of the West (however misguided/wrong/crazy it may be, that hatred is a fact). Ignoring that fact will only prolong this conflict.
I think one thing illustrated in these hearings is that Clinton likely focused too much on diplomatic channels, and Bush is focused a little too much on military might (and possibly a personal agenda in Iraq). Focusing on one or the other and not both is not a good policy.
Posts: 2469 | From: Anchorage, AK | Registered: Oct 2001
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posted
Joe - catch any of the hearing today? Got a bit partisan again. Guiliani's testimony was very interesting - he blamed the terrorists etc. He thought overall the EMS people did great and didn't run creating a panic.
The victims family members at the hearing of course wanted to blame.... well it sounded like Motorola today. They were shouting and yelling about radios not working and the fire department etc. It is sad to see the hearings turn into this.
Posts: 5484 | From: St. Paul, Mn | Registered: Apr 2002
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No thanks Chad ![[Razz]](tongue.gif)
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) I did count one question (I forget which one) she did completely dodge tho 
